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Catharine A. MacKinnon**
Pornosec, the subsection of the Fiction Department which turned out cheap pornography
for dittribution among the proles . .. nicknamed Muck House by the people who
worked in it .. .produce[di booklets in sealed packets with titles like Spanking
Stories or One Night in a Girls' School, to be bought furtively by proletarian
youths who were under the impression that they were buying something illegal. ***
A critique of pornography' is to feminism what its defense is to male
supremacy. Central to the institutionalization of male dominance, por-
• Prior versions of this commentary were given as speeches to the Morality Colloquium,
University of Minnesota, February 17, 1983; Women and the Law Conference, panel on
pornography, April 4, 1983; and Conference on Media Violence and Pornography, Ontario
Institute for Studies in Education, February 3-5, 1984. The title of this article is a play on the
title of the anti-pornography film by the Canadian Film Board, Not a Love Slog (1983).
** Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School; author of Sexual Harassment
of Working Women. Professor MacKinnon, with Andrea Dworkin, conceived and wrote the
civil rights anti-pornography ordinances passed by the Minneapolis and Indianapolis city
councils.
*** G. ORWELL, 1984, at 108-09 (1949).
1. This text as a whole is intended to communicate what I mean by pornography. The
key work on the subject is A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981).
No definition can convey the meaning of a word as well as its use in context can. However
what Andrea Dworkin and I mean by pornography is rather well captured in our legal defini-
tion of the term. "Pornography is the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women,
whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of the following: (i) women are
presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities; or (ii) women are presented
as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or (iii) women are presented as sexual objects
who experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or (iv) women are presented as sexual objects
tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or (v) women are presented in
postures of sexual submission, servility or display; or (vi) women's body parts-including but
not limited to vaginas, breasts, and buttocks-are exhibited, such that women are reduced to
those parts; or (vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or (viii) women are presented
being penetrated by objects or animals; or (ix) women are presented in scenarios of degrada-
tion, injury, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that
makes these conditions sexual." The ordinance also defines "the use of men, children or tran-
sexuals in the place of women" as pornography. Pornography, thus defined, is discrimination
on the basis of sex and, as such, a civil rights violation. This definition is a slightly modified
version of the one passed by the Minneapolis City Council on December 30, 1983. Minneap-
olis, Minn., Ordinance amending tit. 7, chs. 139 & 141, Minneapolis Code of Ordinances
Relating to Civil Rights. The ordinance was vetoed by the Mayor, reintroduced, passed
again, and vetoed again in 1984.
Many of the ideas in this essay were developed and refined in close collaboration with
Andrea Dworkin. It is consequently difficult at times to distinguish the contribution of each
of us to a body of work that-through shared teaching, writing, speaking, organizing, and
political action on every level-has been created together. I have tried to credit specific con-
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nography cannot be reformed or suppressed or banned. It can only be
changed. The legal doctrine of obscenity, the state's closest approxima-
tion to addressing the pornography question, has made the First
Amendment 2 into a barrier to this process. This is partly because the
pornographers' lawyers have persuasively presented First Amendment
absolutism, 3 their advocacy position, as a legal fact, which it never has
been. But they have gotten away with this (to the extent they have) in
part because the abstractness of obscenity as a concept, situated within
an equally abstract approach to freedom of speech embodied in First
Amendment doctrine, has made the indistinguishability of the
pornographers' speech from everyone else's speech, their freedom from
our freedom, appear credible, appealing, necessary, nearly inevitable,
pr'ncipled4 To expose the absence of a critique of gender 5 in this area of
law is to expose both the enforced silence of women and the limits of
liberalism.
This brief preliminary commentary focuses on the obscenity standard
in order to explore some of the larger implications of a feminist critique
of pornography for First Amendment theory. This is the argument.
Obscenity law is concerned with morality, specifically morals from the
tributions that I am aware are distinctly hers. This text is mine; she does not necessarily agree
with everything in it.
2. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Justice Black, at times joined by Justice Douglas, took the position that the Bill of
Rights, including the First Amendment, was "absolute." Justice Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 867 (1960); Cahn,Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes'" A Publi
Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549 (1962). For a discussion, see Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr.
Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. REV. 428 (1967). For one exchange in the
controversy surrounding the "absolute" approach to the First Amendment, as opposed to the
"balancing" approach, see, e.g., Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment. Absolutes in
the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE
L.J. 1424 (1962); Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law.'-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF.
L. REV. 729 (1963); Mendelson, The First Amendment and the Judtial Process. A Reply to Mr.
Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV. 479 (1964). In the pornography context, see, e.g., Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J.,joined by Black, J., dissenting); Smith v. Califor-
nia, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959) (Black, J., concurring); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). It is not the purpose of the current article to present a cri-
tique of absolutism as such, but rather to identify and criticize some widely and deeply shared
implicit beliefs that underlie both the absolutist view and the more mainstream flexible
approaches.
4. The history of obscenity law can be read as a failed attempt to make this separation,
with the failure becoming ever more apparent from the Redrup decision forward. Redrup v.
New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967). For a summary of cases exemplifying such a trend, see the
dissent by Justice Brennan, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973).
5. Much has been made of the distinction between sex and gender. Sex is thought the
more biological, gender the more social. The relation of sexuality to each varies. See, e.g., R.
STOLLER, SEX AND GENDER 9-10 (1974). Since I think that the importance of biology to the
condition of women is the social meaning attributed to it, biology is its social meaning for
purposes of analyzing the inequality of the sexes, a political condition. I therefore tend to use
sex and gender relatively interchangeably.
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male point of view, meaning the standpoint of male dominance. The
feminist critique of pornography is a politics, specifically politics from
women's point of view, meaning the standpoint of the subordination of
women to men.6 Morality here means good and evil; politics means
power and powerlessness. Obscenity is a moral idea; pornography is a
political practice. Obscenity is abstract; pornography is concrete. The
two concepts represent two entirely different things. Nudity, explicit-
ness, excess of candor, arousal or excitement, prurience, unnaturalness-
these qualities bother obscenity law when sex is depicted or portrayed.
Abortion or birth control information or treatments for "restoring sex-
ual virility" (whose, do you suppose?) have also been included. 7 Sex
forced on real women so that it can be sold at a profit to be forced on
other real women; women's bodies trussed and maimed and raped and
made into things to be hurt and obtained and accessed and this
presented as the nature of women; the coercion that is visible and the
coercion that has become invisible-this and more bothers feminists
about pornography. Obscenity as such probably does little harm;8 por-
6. The sense in which I mean women's perspective to differ from men's is like that of
Virginia Woolf's reference to "the difference of view, the difference of standard" in her V.
WOOLF, George Elliot, in I COLLECTED ESSAYS 204 (1966). Neither of us uses the notion of a
gender difference to refer to something biological or natural or transcendental or existential.
Perspective parallels standards because the social experience of gender is distinctive. See C.
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 107-141 (1979), and articles ref-
erenced at note 11, infra; V. WOOLF, THREE GUINEAS (1938); see also A. DWORKIN, The Root
Cause, in OUR BLOOD: ESSAYS AND DISCOURSES ON SEXUAL POLITICS 96 (1976). I do not
refer to the gender difference here descriptively, leaving its roots and implications unspecified,
so they could be biological, existential, transcendental, in any sense inherent, or social but
necessary. I mean "point of view" as a view, hence a standard, that is imposed on women by
force of sex inequality, which is a political condition. "Male" is an adjective here, a social
and political concept, not a biological attribute; it is a status socially conferred upon a person
because of a condition of birth. As I use it, it has nothing whatever to do with inherency,
preexistence, nature, inevitability, or body as such. Because it is in the interest of men to be
male in the system we live under (male being powerful as well as human), they seldom ques-
tion its rewards or even see it as a status at all.
7. Criminal Code, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. c-34, § 159(2)(c) and (d) (1970). People v.
Sanger, 222 N.Y. 192, 118 N.E. 637 (1918).
8. THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970) (major-
ity report). The accuracy of the Commission's findings is called into question by:
(a) widespread criticism of the Commission's methodology from a variety of perspectives,
e.g., SUTHERLAND, OBSCENITY-THE COURT, THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION (1975); Donnerstein, Pornography Commission Revit'ed: Aggresso-Erotica and Violence
Agazist Women, 39 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 269 (1980); Garry, Pornography
and Respect for Women, Soc. THEORY & PRACTICE 4 (Summer 1978); Diamond, Pornography and
Repression, 5 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC. 686 (1980); Cline, Another View. Pornog-
raphy Affects the State of the Art, in WHERE Do YOU DRAW THE LINE? (V.B. Cline ed. 1974);
Bart & Jozsa, Dirty Books, Dirty Films, and Dirty Data, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON
PORNOGRAPHY 204 (L. Lederer ed. 1982);
(b) the Commission's tendency to minimize the significance of its own findings, e.g., those
by Mosher on the differential effects of exposure by gender;
(c) the design of the Commission's research. The Commission did not focus questions
about gender, did its best to eliminate "violence" from its materials (so as not to overlap with
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nography causes attitudes and behaviors of violence and discrimination
which define the treatment and status of half of the population.9 To
make the legal and philosophical consequences of this distinction clear, I
will describe the feminist critique of pornography (I); then criticize the
law of obscenity in terms of it (II); then discuss the criticism that por-
nography "dehumanizes" women (III) to distinguish the male morality
of liberalism and obscenity law from a feminist political critique of
pornography. 10
the Violence Commission), and propounded unscientific theories such as Puritan guilt to ex-
plain women's negative responses to the materials.
It should further be noted that it is unclear that scientific causality is what legally validates
even an obscenity regulation:
But, it is argued, there is no scientific data which conclusively demonstrate that expo-
sure to obscene materials adversely affects men and women or their society. It is [urged]
that, absent such a demonstration, any kind of state regulation is "impermissible." We
reject this argument. It is not for us to resolve empirical uncertainties underlying state
legislation, save in the exceptional case where that legislation plainly impinges upon
rights protected by the Constitution itself. . . Although there is no conclusive proof of a
connection between antisocial behavior and obscene material, the legislature of Georgia
could quite reasonably determine that such a connection does or might exist.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973) (Burger, J., for the majority); see
also Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 501 (1956).
9. Some of the harm of pornography to women, as defined supra at note I and as discussed
in this article, has been documented in empirical studies. The findings of recent studies are
that exposure to pornography increases normal men's willingness to aggress against women
under laboratory conditions; makes both women and men substantially less able to perceive
accounts of rape as accounts of rape; makes normal men more closely resemble convicted
rapists psychologically; increases attitudinal measures that are known to correlate with rape,
such as hostility toward women, propensity to rape, condoning rape, and predicting that one
would rape or force sex on a woman if one knew one would not get caught; and produces
other attitude changes in men such as increasing the extent of their trivialization, dehumani-
zation, and objectification of women. Russell, Pornography and Violence. What Does the New
Research Say?, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT, supra note 8, at 216; N. MALAMUTH & E. DONNER-
STEIN, PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION (1984); Z. VILLMAN, THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN SEX AND AGGRESSION (1984): J.V.P. Check, N. Malamuth & R. Stille, Hostility to
Women Scale (1983) (unpublished manuscript); Donnerstein, Pornography: Its Effects on Volence
Against Women, in N. MALAMUTH & E. DONNERSTEIN, supra; Malamuth and Check, The Ef-
fects of Mass Media Exposure on Acceptance of Violence Against Women: A Field Experiment, 15 J. OF
RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY 436 (1981); Malamuth, Rape Proclivities Among Males, 37 J. OF
SOCIAL ISSUES 138 (1981); Malamuth and Spinner, A Longitudinal Content Analysis of Sexual
Violence in the Best-Selling Erotica Magazines, 16 J. OF SEX RESEARCH 226 (1980); Mosher, Sex
Callousness Towards Women, in 8 TECHNICAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY
AND PORNOGRAPHY 313 (1971); Zillman & Bryant, Eects of Masstve Exposure to Pornography, in
N. MALAMUTH & E. DONNERSTEIN, supra.
10. The following are illustrative, not exhaustive, of the body of work I term the "feminist
critique of pornography." A. DWORKIN, supra note I; Leidholdt, Where Pornography Meets
Fascism, WIN 18 (March 15, 1983); Steiner, Night Words, in THE CASE AGAINST PORNOGRA-
PHY 227 (D. Holbrook ed. 1973); S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND
RAPE 394 (1975); R. Morgan, Pornography andRape." Theory andPractice, in GOING Too FAR 165
(R. Morgan ed. 1977); K. BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY (1979); AGAINST SADO-MAS-
OCHISM: A RADICAL FEMINIST ANALYSIS (R.R. Linden, D.R. Pagano, D.E.H. Russell & S.L.
Star eds. 1982), especially articles by Ti-Grace Atkinson, Judy Butler, Andrea Dworkin, Alice
Walker, John Stoltenberg, Audre Lorde, and Susan Leigh Star; Walker, Coming Apart, in
TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 8, and other articles in that
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This inquiry is part of a larger project that attempts to account for
gender inequality in the socially constructed relationship between
power-the political-on the one hand and knowledge of truth and re-
ality-the epistemological-on the other. For example, the candid
description Justice Stewart once offered of his obscenity standard, "I
know it when I see it, ' ' 12 becomes even more revealing than it is usually
understood to be, if taken as a statement that connects epistemology
with power. If I ask, from the point of view of women's experience, does
he know what I know when I see what I see, I find that I doubt it, given
what's on the newsstands. How does his point of view keep what is
there, there? To liberal critics, his admission exposed the obscenity stan-
dard's relativity, its partiality, its insufficient abstractness. Not to be
emptily universal, to leave your concreteness showing, is a sin among
men. Their problem with Justice Stewart's formulation is that it implies
that anything, capriciously, could be suppressed. They are only right by
half. My problem is more the other half: the meaning of what his view
permits, which, as it turns out, is anything but capricious. In fact, it is
entirely systematic and determinate. To me, his statement is precisely
descriptively accurate; its candor is why it has drawn so much criti-
cism.' 3 Justice Stewart got in so much trouble because he said out loud
what is actually done all the time; in so doing, he both did it and gave it
the stature of doctrine, even if only dictum. That is, the obscenity stan-
dard-in this it is not unique-is built on what the male standpoint sees.
My point will be: so is pornography. In this way, the law of obscenity
reproduces the pornographic point of view on women on the level of
Constitutional jurisprudence.
I
Pornography, in the feminist view, is a form of forced sex, a practice
of sexual politics, an institution of gender inequality. In this perspec-
volume with the exception of the legal ones; G. VIDAL, Women's Liberation Meets the Miller-
Maier-Manson Man, HOMAGE TO DANIEL SHAYS: COLLECTED ESSAYS 1952-1972, 389 (1969);
L. LOVELACE, ORDEAL (1980); K. MILLETr, SEXUAL POLITICS (1969); F. RUSH, THE BEST
KEPT SECRET: SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN (1980). Violent Pornography.- Degradation of Women
versus Right of Free Speech, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. SoC. CHANGE 181 (1978-79) contains both femi-
nist and non-feminist arguments.
11. For more extensive discussions of this subject, see my prior work, especially Feminism,
Marxismr, Method and the State.- An Agenda for Theoty, 7 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC.
515 (1982) [hereinafter cited as SIGNS I]; Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State.. Toward Femi-
nistJursprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc. 635 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
SIGNS II].
12. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
13. Justice Stewart has been said to have complained that this single line was more
quoted and remembered than anything else he ever said.
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tive, pornography is not harmless fantasy or a corrupt and confused mis-
representation of an otherwise natural and healthy sexuality. With the
rape and prostitution in which it participates, pornography institution-
alizes the sexuality of male supremacy, which fuses the erotization of
dominance and submission with the social construction of male and fe-
male. 14 Gender is sexual. Pornography constitutes the meaning of that
sexuality. Men treat women as who they see women as being. Pornog-
raphy constructs who that is. Men's power over women means that the
way men see women defines who women can be. Pornography is that
way.
In pornography, women desire dispossession and cruelty. Men, per-
mitted to put words (and other things) in women's mouths, create scenes
in which women desperately want to be bound, battered, tortured, hu-
miliated, and killed. Or, merely taken and used. This is erotic to the
male point of view. Subjection itself, with self-determination ecstati-
cally relinquished, is the content of women's sexual desire and desirabil-
ity. Women are there to be violated and possessed, men to violate and
possess them, either on screen or by camera or pen, on behalf of the
viewer.
One can be for or against this pornography without getting beyond
liberalism. The critical yet formally liberal view of Susan Griffin, for
example, conceptualizes eroticism as natural and healthy but corrupted
and confused by "the pornographic mind."1 5 Pornography distorts
Eros, which preexists and persists, despite male culture's pornographic
"revenge" upon it. Eros is, unaccountably, still there. Pornography mis-
takes it, mis-images it, mis-represents it. There is no critique of reality
here, only objections to how it is seen; no critique of that reality that
pornography imposes on women's real lives, those lives that are so seam-
lessly consistent with the pornography that pornography can be credibly
defended by saying it is only a mirror of reality.
Contrast this view with the feminist analysis of Andrea Dworkin, in
which sexuality itself is a social construct, gendered to the ground. Male
dominance here is not an artificial overlay upon an underlying inaltera-
ble substratum of uncorrupted essential sexual being. Sexuality free of
male dominance will require change, not reconceptualization, transcen-
dence or excavation. Pornography is not imagery in some relation to a
reality elsewhere constructed. It is not a distortion, reflection, projec-
tion, expression, fantasy, representation or symbol either. It is sexual
14. See, SIGNS I, supra note 11.
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reality. Dworkin's Pornography." Men Possessing Women 16 presents a sexual
theory of gender inequality of which pornography is a core constitutive
practice. The way pornography produces its meaning constructs and
defines men and women as such. Gender is what gender means. 17 It has
no basis in anything other than the social reality its hegemony con-
structs. The process that gives sexuality its male supremacist meaning is
therefore the process through which gender inequality becomes socially
real.
In this analysis, the liberal defense of pornography as human sexual
liberation, as de-repression-whether by feminists, lawyers, or neo-
Freudians' 8 -is a defense not only of force and sexual terrorism, but of
the subordination of women. Sexual liberation in the liberal sense frees
male sexual aggression in the feminist sense. What in the liberal view
looks like love and romance looks a lot like hatred and torture to the
feminist. Pleasure and eroticism become violation. Desire appears as
lust for dominance and submission. The vulnerability of women's pro-
jected sexual availability-that acting we are allowed: asking to be ac-
ted upon-is victimization. Play conforms to scripted roles, fantasy
expresses ideology-is not exempt from it-and admiration of natural
physical beauty becomes objectification.
The experience of the (overwhelmingly) male audiences who consume
pornography 19 is therefore not fantasy or simulation or catharsis20 but
16. A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN, supra note 1.
17. See also, A. DWORKIN, The Root Cause, in OUR BLOOD, supra note 6.
18. The position that pornography is sex-that whatever you think of sex you think of
pornography-underlies nearly every treatment of the subject. In particular, nearly every
non-feminist treatment proceeds on the implicit or explicit assumption, argument, criticism,
or suspicion that pornography is sexually liberating in some way, a position unifying an
otherwise diverse literature. See, e.g., D.H. LAWRENCE, Pornography and Obscenz'y, in SEX,
LITERATURE AND CENSORSHIP 64 (1959); Hefner, The Playboy Philosophy, PLAYBOY, Dec.
1962, at 73, and PLAYBOY Feb. 1963, at 43; HENRY MILLER, Obscenity and the Law of Refection,
in REMEMBER TO REMEMBER 274, 286 (1947); English, The Pohhcs of Porn." Can Feminists Walk
the Line?, MOTHER JONES, April 1980, at 20; Elshtain, The Victim Syndrome. A Troubhng Turn in
Feminzm, THE PROGRESSIVE, June 1982, at 42. To choose an example at random:
In opposition to the Victorian view that narrowly defines proper sexual function in a
rigid way that is analogous to ideas of excremental regularity and moderation, pornogra-
phy builds a model of plastic variety and joyful excess in sexuality. In opposition to the
sorrowing Catholic dismissal of sexuality as an unfortunate and spiritually superficial
concomitant of propagation, pornography affords the alternative idea of the independ-
ent status of sexuality as a profound and shattering ecstasy.
Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 45, 81 (1974) (footnotes omitted). See also F. Schauer, Response.- Pornography and the
First Amendment, 40 U. PIr. L. REV. 605, 616 (1979).
19. Spending time around adult bookstores, attending pornographic movies and talking
with pornographers (who, like all smart pimps, do some form of market research), as well as
analyzing the pornography itself in sex/gender terms, all confirm that pornography is for
men. That women may attend or otherwise consume it does not make it any less for men, any
more than the observation that mostly men consume pornography means that pornography
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sexual reality: the level of reality on which sex itself largely operates. To
understand this does not require noticing that pornography models are
real women to whom something real is being done, 2 1 nor does it even
require inquiring into the systematic infliction of pornographic sexuality
upon women, 22 although it helps. The aesthetic of pornography itself,
the way it provides what those who consume it want, is itself the evi-
dence. When uncensored explicit-i.e. the most pornographic-pornog-
raphy tells all, all means what a distanced detached observer would
report about who did what to whom. This is the turn-on. Why does
observing sex objectively presented cause the male viewer to experience
his own sexuality? Because his eroticism is, socially, a watched thing.
If objectivity is the epistemological stance of which objectification is
the social process, 23 the way a perceptual posture is embodied as a social
form of power, the most sexually potent depictions and descriptions
would be the most objective blow-by-blow re-presentations. Pornogra-
phy participates in its audience's eroticism because it creates an accessi-
ble sexual object, the possession and consumption of which is male
sexuality, to be consumed and possessed as which is female sexuality. In
this sense, sex in life is no less mediated than it is in art. Men have sex
with their image of a woman. Escalating explicitness, "exceeding the
bounds of candor," 24 is the aesthetic of pornography not because the
does not harm women. See Lagelan, The Poltical Economy ofPornography, AEGIS: MAGAZINE ON
ENDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, Autumn 1981, at 5; Cook, The A-Rated Economy,
FORBES, Sept. 18, 1978, at 60. Personal observation reveals that women tend to avoid por-
nography as much as possible-which is not very much, as it turns out.
20. The "fantasy" and "catharsis" hypotheses, together, assert that pornography cathects
sexuality on the level of fantasy fulfillment. The work of Donnerstein, particularly, shows
that the opposite is true. The more pornography is viewed, the more pornography-and the
more brutal pornography-is both wanted and required for sexual arousal. What occurs is
not catharsis, but desensitization, requiring progressively more potent stimulation. See works
cited supra at note 9; Straus, Leveling, Ciility, and Violence in the Family, 36 J. OF MARRIAGE &
FAMILY 13 (1974).
21. L. LOVELACE, supra note 10, provides an account by one coerced pornography model.
See also Dworkin, Pornography's "Exquiite Volunteers," Ms., March 1981, at 65.
22. However, for one such inquiry, see Russell, supra note 9, at 228 (random sample of 900
San Francisco households found that 10 percent of women had at least once "been upset by
anyone trying to get you to do what they'd seen in pornographic pictures, movies or books.")
Obviously, this figure could only include those who knew that the pornography was the
source of the sex, which makes its findings conservative. See also D. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MAR-
RIAGE 27-41 (1983) (discussing the data base). The hearings Andrea Dworkin and I held for
the Minneapolis City Council on the ordinance, cited in note 1, produced many accounts of
the use of pornography to force sex on women and children. Pubhlic Hearings on Ordinances to
Add Pornography as Discrimination Against Women, Committee on Government Operations, City
Council, Minneapolis, Minn., Dec. 12-13, 1983. (Hereinafter Hearings).
23. See SIGNS I, supra note 11. See also Sontag, The Pornographic Imagination, 34 PARTISAN
REVIEW 181 (1977).
24. "Explicitness" of accounts is a central issue in both obscenity adjudications and audi-
ence access standards adopted voluntarily by self-regulated industries or by boards of censor.
See, e.g., Grove Press v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (discussion of
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materials depict objectified sex but because they create the experience of
a sexuality which is itself objectified. It is not that life and art imitate
each other; in sexuality, they are each other.
II
The law of obscenity, 25 the state's primary approach2 6 to its version of
the pornography question, has literally nothing in common with this
feminist critique. Their obscenity is not our pornography. One com-
mentator has said, "Obscenity is not suppressed primarily for the protec-
tion of others. Much of it is suppressed for the purity of the
'community.' Obscenity, at bottom, is not a crime. Obscenity is a
sin."' 27 This is, on one level, literally accurate. Men are turned on by
obscenity, including its suppression, the same way they are by sin.
Animated by morality from the male standpoint, in which violation-of
women and rules-is eroticized, obscenity law can be seen to proceed
according to the interest of male power, robed in gender-neutral good
and evil.
Morality in its specifically liberal form (although, as with most
dimensions of male dominance, the distinction between left and right is
more formal than substantive) revolves around a set of parallel distinc-
tions which can be consistently traced through obscenity law. Even
though the approach this law takes to the problem it envisions has
"candor" and "realism"); Grove Press v. Christenberry, 276 F. 2d 433, 438 (2d Cir. 1960)
("directness"); Mitchum v. State, 251 So. 2d 298, 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) ("show it
all"); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 118 (1973). How much sex the depiction shows is
implicitly thereby correlated with how sexual (i.e., how sexually arousing to the male) the
material is. See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 460 (1966) (White, J., dissent-
ing); Heffner, What G, PC, R and A' Really Means 126, CONG. REc. 172 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1980);
Report of the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship (the Williams Report) (1981). Andrea
Dworkin brilliantly gives the reader the experience of this aesthetic in her account of the
pornography. A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN, supra note 1, at 25-
47.
25. To the body of law ably encompassed and footnoted by Lockhart & McClure, Litera-
ture, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295 (1954) and Censorship of
Obscenity, 45 MINN. L REv. 5 (1960), I add only the most important cases since then: Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); U.S. v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1970); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Hamling v. U.S., 418 U.S.
87 (1973); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1973); U.S. v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM
Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Splawn v.
California, 431 U.S. 595 (1976); Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1976); Lovisi v. Slayton, 539
F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976). New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
26. For a discussion of the role of the law of privacy in supporting the existence of pornog-
raphy, see Colker, Pornography and Privacy." Towards the Development of a Group Based Theory for Sex
Based Intrusions of Privacy, 1 LAW AND INEQUALITY: A JOURNAL OF THEORY AND PRACTICE
191 (1983).
27. Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COL. L. REV. 391, 395
(1963).
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shifted over time, its fundamental norms remain consistent: public is
opposed to private, in parallel with ethics and morality, and factual is
opposed to valued determinations. These distinctions are gender-based:
female is private, moral, valued, subjective; male is public, ethical, fac-
tual, objective. 28 If such gendered concepts are constructs of the male
experience, imposed from the male standpoint on society as a whole,
liberal morality expresses male supremacist politics. That is, discourse
conducted in terms of good and evil which does not expose the gendered
foundations of these concepts proceeds oblivious to-and serves to dis-
guise the presence and interest of-the position of power that underlies,
and is furthered by, that discourse.
For example, obscenity law proposes to control what and how sex can
be publicly shown. In practice, its standard centers upon the same fea-
tures feminism identifies as key to male sexuality: the erect penis and
penetration. 29 Historically, obscenity law was vexed by restricting such
portrayals while protecting great literature. (Nobody considered pro-
tecting women.) Having solved this by exempting works of perceived
value from obscenity restrictions, 30 the subsequent relaxation-some
might say collapse-of obscenity restrictions in the last decade reveals a
significant shift. The old private rules have become the new public
rules. The old law governing pornography was that it would be publicly
repudiated while being privately consumed and actualized: do anything
to women with impunity in private behind a veil of public denial and
civility. Now pornography is publicly celebrated. 3' This victory for
28. These parallels are discussed more fully in SIGNS II, supra note 11. It may seem odd to
denominate "moral" as female here, since this article discusses male morality. Under male
supremacy, men define things; I am describing that. Men define women as "moral." This is
the male view of women. My analysis, a feminist critique of the male standpoint, terms
"moral" the concept that pornography is about good and evil. This is my analysis of them, as
contrasted with their attributions of women.
29. A reading of case law supports the reports in R. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN 194 (1979), to the effect that this is a "bottom line" criterion for at least some
justices. The interesting question becomes why the tactics of male supremacy would change
from keeping the penis hidden, covertly glorified, to having it everywhere on display, overtly
glorified. This suggests at least that a major shift from private terrorism to public terrorism
has occurred. What used to be perceived as a danger to male power, the exposure of the
penis, has now become a strategy in maintaining it.
30. One possible reading of McClure & Lockhart, supra note 25, is that this was their
agenda, and that their approach was substantially adopted in the third prong of the Miller
doctrine. For the law's leading attempt to grapple with this issue, see A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413 (1966), overruled in part, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See also U.S. v. One Book
Entitled "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aft'd 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
31. Andrea Dworkin and I developed this analysis in our class, "Pornography," at the
University of Minnesota Law School, Fall 1983. See also Dworkin, Why So-Called Radical Men
Love and Need Pornography, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT, supra note 8, at 141 (the issue of pornog-
raphy is an issue of sexual access to women, hence involves a fight among men).
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Freudian derepression theory probably did not alter women's actual
treatment all that much. Women were sex and still are sex. Greater
efforts of brutality have become necessary to eroticize the taboo-each
taboo being a hierarchy in disguise-since the frontier of the taboo
keeps vanishing as one crosses it. Put another way, more and more vio-
lence has become necessary to keep the progressively desensitized con-
sumer aroused to the illusion that sex is (and he is) daring and
dangerous. Making sex with the powerless "not allowed" is a way of
keeping "getting it" defined as an act of power, an assertion of hierar-
chy. In addition, pornography has become ubiquitous. Sexual terror-
ism has become democratized. Crucially, pornography has become
truly available to women for the first time in history. Show me an atroc-
ity to women, I'll show it to you eroticized in the pornography. This
central mechanism of sexual subordination, this means of systematizing
the definition of women as a sexual class, has now become available to
its victims for scrutiny and analysis as an open public system, not just as
a private secret abuse. 32 Hopefully, this was a mistake.
Re-examining the law of obscenity in light of the feminist critique of
pornography that has become possible, it becomes clear that male mo-
rality sees that which maintains its power as good, that which under-
mines or qualifies it or questions its absoluteness as evil. Differences in
the law over time-such as the liberalization of obscenity doctrine-
reflect either changes in which group of men have power or shifts in
perceptions of the best strategy for maintaining male supremacy-prob-
ably some of both. But it must be made to work. The outcome, descrip-
tively analyzed, is that obscenity law prohibits what it sees as immoral,
which from a feminist standpoint tends to be relatively harmless, while
protecting what it sees as moral, which from a feminist standpoint is
often that which is damaging to women. So it, too, is a politics, only
covertly so. What male morality finds evil, meaning threatening to its
power, feminist politics tends to find comparatively harmless. What
feminist politics identifies as central in our subordination-i.e. the ero-
tization of dominance and submission-male morality will tend to find
32. Those termed "fathers" and "sons" in Andrea Dworkin's article, supra note 31, we
came to term "the old boys," whose strategy for male dominance involves keeping pornogra-
phy and the abuse of women private, and "the new boys," whose strategy for male dominance
involves making pornography and the abuse of women public. In my view, Freud, and the
popularization of his derepression hypothesis, figures centrally in "the new boys" approach
and success. To conclude, as some have, that women have benefitted from the public availa-
bility of pornography, hence should be grateful for its continuing availability, is to say that
the merits of open condoned oppression relative to covert condoned oppression warrant its
continuation. This reasoning obscures the possibility of ending the oppression. The benefit of
pornography's open availability, it seems to me, is that women can know who and what we
are dealing with in order to end it. How, is the question.
Yale Law & Policy Review
comparatively harmless or defend as affirmatively valuable, hence pro-
tected speech.
In 1973, obscenity under law came to mean that which " 'the average
person applying contemporary community standards' would find
that, . . . taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient inter-
est . . . [which] depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and [which],
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value."' 33 Feminism doubts whether the average person, gender neutral,
exists; has more questions about the content and process of definition of
community standards than deviations from them; wonders why pruri-
ence counts but powerlessness doesn't; why sensibilities are better pro-
tected from offense than women are from exploitation; defines sexuality,
hence its violation and expropriation, more broadly than does any state
law and wonders why a body of law which can't in practice tell rape
from intercourse should be entrusted with telling pornography from
anything less. In feminist perspective, one notices that although the law
of obscenity says that fucking on streetcorners is not supposed to be le-
gitimized by the fact that the persons are "simultaneously engaged in a
valid political dialogue, ' 34 the requirement that the work be considered
"as a whole" legitimizes something very like that on the level of publica-
tions like Playboy,- 5 even though experimental evidence is beginning to
support what its victims have long known: legitimate settings diminish
the injury perceived as done to the women whose trivialization and ob-
jectification it contextualizes. 36 Besides, if a woman is subjected, why
should it matter that the work has other value?37 Perhaps what redeems
33. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
34. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973). See also Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 25 n.7 ("A quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not constitution-
ally redeem an otherwise obscene publication.") (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229,
231 (1972)).
35. Penthouse International v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1362-73 (5th Cir. 1980). For a
study in enforcement, see Coble v. City of Birmingham, 389 So. 2d 527 (Ala. Ct. App. 1980).
36. Malamuth and Spinner, supra note 9 (". . .the portrayal of sexual aggression within
such 'legitimate' magazines as PLAYBOY and PENTHOUSE may have a greater impact than
similar portrayals in hard-core pornography.") Malamuth and Donnerstein, The Efects of
Aggressive-Pornographic Mass Media Stimuli, in 15 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 103, 130 (1982).
37. Some courts, under the obscenity rubric, seem to have understood that the quality of
artistry does not undo the damage. People v. Mature Enterprises, 343 N.Y.S.2d 911, 925 n.
14 (1973)("This court will not adopt a rule of law which states that obscenity is suppressible
but that well-written or technically well produced obscenity is not.") (quoting, in part, Peo-
ple v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 126, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1, 7, 192 N.E.2d 713 (1963)). More to the
point of my argument here is Justice O'Connor's observation that "[t]he compelling interests
identified in today's opinion .. . suggest that the Constitution might in fact permit New
York to ban knowing distribution of works depicting minors engaged in explicit sexual con-
duct, regardless of the social value of the depictions. For example, a 12-year-old child photo-
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a work's value among men enhances its injury to women. Existing stan-
dards of literature, art, science and politics are, in feminist light, remark-
ably consonant with pornography's mode, meaning and message.
Finally and foremost, a feminist approach reveals that although the con-
tent and dynamic of pornography are about women-about the sexual-
ity of women, about women as sexuality-in the same way that the vast
majority of "obscenities" refer specifically to women's bodies, our invisi-
bility has been such that the law of obscenity has never even considered
pornography a women's issue.38
To appeal to "prurient interest" 39 means, I believe, to give a man an
erection. Men are scared to make it possible for some men to tell other
men what they can and cannot have sexual access to because men have
power. If you don't let them have theirs, they might not let you have
yours. This is why the indefinabihily of pornography, "all the one man's
this is another man's that," 40 is so central to pronography's defnl'tion. It
is not because they are such great liberals, but because those other men
might be able to do to them whatever they can do to those other men,
and this is more why the liberal principle is what it is. What this ob-
scures, because the fought-over are invisible in it, is that the fight over a
definition of obscenity is a fight among men over the best means to
guarantee male power as a system. The question is, whose sexual prac-
graphed while masturbating surely suffers the same psychological harm whether the
community labels the photography 'edifying' or 'tasteless.' The audience's appreciation of
the depiction is simply irrelevant to New York's asserted interest in protecting children from
psychological, emotional, and mental harm." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774-75
(1982) (concurring). Put another way, how does it make a harmed child not harmedthat what
was produced by harming him is great art?
38. Women typically get mentioned in obscenity law only in the phrase, "women and
men," used as a synonym for "people." At the same time, exactly who the victim of pornog-
raphy is, has long been a great mystery. The few references to "exploitation" in obscenity
litigation clarify the issue in at least one respect: the victim is not female. For example, one
reference to "a system of commercial exploitation of people with sadomasochistic sexual aber-
rations" concerned the customers of women dominatrixes, all of whom were male. State v.
Von Cleef, 102 N.J. Super. 104, 245, A.2d 495, 505 (1968). The children at issue in Ferber
were male. Justice Frankfurter invoked the "sordid exploitation of man's nature and im-
pulses" in discussing his conception of pornography in Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents,
360 U.S. 684, 692 (1958).
39. Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)
40. See, e.g., Miller v. California, id., at 40-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("What shocks me
may be sustenance for my neighbors."); U.S. v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 137
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[W]hat may be trash to me may be prized by others.").
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1970) (Harlan, J.,) ("One man's vulgarity is another's
lyric"). Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1947) ("What is one man's amusement,
teaches another's doctrine."); D.H. Lawrence, PORNOGRAPHIC AND OBSCENITY 5 (1929). As
put by Chuck Traynor, the pimp who forced Linda Lovelace into pornography, "I don't tell
you how to write your column. Don't tell me how to treat my broads," quoted in G.
STEINEM, The Real Linda Lovelace, in OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AND EVERYDAY REBELLIONS 243,
252 (1983).
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tices threaten this that can afford to be sacrificed to its maintenance for
the rest? Public sexual access by men to anything other than women is
less likely to be protected speech. This is not to say that male sexual
access to anything-children, other men, women with women, objects,
animals-is not the real system. The issue is how pub/'c that system will
be, which the obscenity laws, their definition and patterns of enforce-
ment, are major in regulating. The bind of the "prurient interest" stan-
dard here is that, to find it as a fact, someone has to admit that they are
sexually aroused by the materials4 1 but male sexual arousal signals the
importance of protecting them. They put themselves in this bind and
then wonder why they cannot agree. Sometimes I think that what is
ultimately found obscene is what does not turn on the Supreme Court, or
what revolts them more, which is rare, since revulsion is eroticized;
sometimes I think that what is obscene is what turns on those men that
the men in power think they can afford to ignore; sometimes I think that
part of it is that what looks obscene to them is what makes them see
themselves as potential targets of male sexual aggression, even if only
momentarily; sometimes I think that the real issue is how male sexuality
is presented, so that anything can be done to a woman but obscenity is
that sex that makes male sexuality look bad.42
Courts' difficulties framing workable standards to separate "prurient"
from other sexual interest, commercial exploitation from art or advertis-
ing, sexual speech from sexual conduct, and obscenity from great litera-
ture make the feminist point. These lines have proven elusive in law
because they do not exist in life. Commercial sex resembles art because
both exploit women's sexuality. The liberal's slippery slope is the femi-
nist totality. Whatever obscenity may do, pornography converges with
more conventionally acceptable depictions and descriptions like rape
does with intercourse because both express the same power relation.
Just as it is difficult to distinguish literature or art against a background,
a standard, of objectification, it is difficult to discern sexual freedom
41. For the resolution of this issue for non-standard sexuality, see Mishkin v. New York,
383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966).
42. None of this is intended as a comment about the personal sexuality or principles of
any judicial individual, but rather as a series of analytic observations that emerge from a
feminist attempt to interpret the deep social structure of a vast body of case law on the basis
of a critique of gender. Further research should systematically analyze the contents of the
pornography involved in the cases. For instance, with respect to the last hypothesis in the text
above, is it just chance that the first film to be found obscene by a state supreme court depicts
male masturbation? Landau v. Fording, 245 C.A.2d 820, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1966). Given
the ubiquity of the infantilization of women and the sexualization of little girls, would Ferber
have been decided the same way if it had shown 12-year-old girls masturbating? Is the depic-
tion of male sexuality in a way that men think is dangerous for women and children to see,
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against a background, a standard, of sexual coercion. This does not
mean it cannot be done. It means that legal standards will be practi-
cally unenforceable, will reproduce this problem rather than solve it,
until they address its fundamental issue-gender inequality-directly.
To define the pornographic as the "patently offensive" further mis-
construes its harm. Pornography is not bad manners or poor choice of
audience; obscenity is. Pornography is also not an idea; obscenity is.
The legal fiction whereby the obscene is "not speech" 43 has deceived
few; it has effectively avoided the need to adjudicate pornography's so-
cial etiology. But obscenity law got one thing right: pornography is
more act-like than thought-like. The fact that pornography, in a femi-
nist view, furthers the idea of the sexual inferiority of women, a political
idea, does not make the pornography itself a political idea. That one
can express the idea a practice embodies does not make that practice
into an idea. Pornography is not an idea any more than segregation is
an idea, although both institutionalize the idea of the inferiority of one
group to another. The law considers obscenity deviant, anti-social. If it
causes harm, it causes anti-social acts, acts against the social order.44 In
a feminist perspective, pornography is the essence of a sexist social order,
its quintessential social act.
If pornography is an act of male supremacy, its harm is the harm of
male supremacy made difficult to see because of its pervasiveness, po-
tency, and success in making the world a pornographic place. Specifi-
cally, the harm cannot be discerned from the objective standpoint
because it I's so much of "what is." Women live in the world pornogra-
phy creates. We live its lie as reality. As Naomi Scheman has said, "lies
are what we have lived, not just what we have told, and no story about
correspondence to what is real will enable us to distinguish the truth
from the lie."'45 So the issue is not what the harm of pornography is, but
how the harm of pornography is to become visible. As compared with
what? To the extent pornography succeeds in constructing social real-
ity, it becomes invisible as harm. Any perception of the success, therefore
the harm, of pornography, I will next argue, is precluded by liberalism
43. Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957), but cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) in
which the right to private possession of obscene materials is protected as a First Amendment
speech right. See 67 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 850 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975).
44. See, e.g., THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY,
supra note 8, at I (charging the Commission to study "[tlhe effect of obscenity and pornogra-
phy upon the public and particularly minors and its relation to crime and other antisocial
behavior.").
45. N. Scheman, "Making it All Up," (transcript of speech, Jan. 1982, available from the
author).
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and so has been defined out of the customary approach taken to, and
dominant values underlying, the First Amendment.
The theory of the First Amendment under which most pornography is
protected from governmental restriction proceeds from liberal assump-
tions46 which do not apply to the situation of women. First Amendment
theory, like virtually all liberal legal theory, presumes the validity of the
distinction between public and private: the "role of law [is] to mark and
guard the line between the sphere of social power, organized in the form
of the state, and the area of private right. '4 7 On this basis, courts distin-
guish between obscenity in public (which can be regulated, even if at-
tempts founder, some seemingly in part because the presentations are
public) 48 and the private possession of obscenity in the home. 49 The
problem is that not only the public but also the private is a "sphere of
social power" of sexism. On paper and in life pornography is thrust
upon unwilling women in their homes.50 The distinction between pub-
lic and private does not cut the same for women as for men.5 1 It is men's
right to inflict pornogi-aphy upon women in private that is protected.
The liberal theory underlying First Amendment law further believes
that free speech, including pornography, helps discover truth. Censor-
ship restricts society to partial truths. So why are we now-with more
pornography available than ever before-buried in all these lies? Laissez
faire might be an adequate theory of the social preconditions for knowl-
edge in a nonhierarchical society. But in a society of gender inequality
the speech of the powerful impresses its view upon the world, concealing
46. For the general body of work to which I refer, which is usually taken to be diverse, see
T. I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1967); T. I.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); A. MEIKELJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring, joined by Holmes, J.); Scanlon, A Theory of Free
Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Z.
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 245 (1948). This literature is ably summa-
rized and anatomized by Ed Baker, who proposes an interpretative theory that goes far to-
ward responding to my objections here, without really altering the basic assumptions I
criticize. See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978)
and The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 So. CAL. L. REV. 293
(1982).
47. T.I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 28 (1966).
48. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Bread v. Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87-89 (1949).
49. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
50. See A. Walker, Coming Apart, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT, supra note 8, at 95; D. Russell
supra note 9; Hearings (Minneapolis) supra note 22. Cf Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 71 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[In] a life that has not been short, I have yet to
be trapped into seeing or reading something that would offend me."). He probably hadn't.
51. See my The Male Ideology of Privay. A Feminist Perspective on the Right to Abortion, RADICAL
AMERICA, Feb. 1984, at 23-35, for a fuller discussion of this point.
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the truth of powerlessness under that despairing acquiescence which
provides the appearance of consent and makes protest inaudible as well
as rare. Pornography can invent women because it has the power to
make its vision into reality, which then passes, objectively, for truth. So
while the First Amendment supports pornography believing that con-
sensus and progress is facilitated by allowing all views, however diver-
gent and unorthodox, it fails to notice that pornography (like the
racism, in which I include anti-Semitism, of the Nazis and the Klan) is
not at all divergent or unorthodox. It is the ruling ideology. Feminism,
the dissenting view, is suppressed by pornography. Thus, while defend-
ers of pornography argue that allowing all speech, including pornogra-
phy, frees the mind to fulfill itself, pornography freely enslaves women's
minds and bodies inseparably, normalizing the terror that enforces si-
lence from women's point of view.
To liberals, speech must never be sacrificed for other social goals. 52
But liberalism has never understood that the free speech of men silences
the free speech of women. It is the same social goal, just other people.
This is what a real inequality, a real conflict, a real disparity in social
power looks like. The law of the First Amendment comprehends that
freedom of expression, in the abstract, is a system but fails to compre-
hend that sexism (and racism), in the concrete, are also systems. That por-
nography chills women's expression is difficult to demonstrate
empirically because silence is not eloquent. Yet on no more of the same
kind of evidence, the argument that suppressing pornography might
chill legitimate speech has supported its protection.
First Amendment logic, like nearly all legal reasoning, has difficulty
grasping harm that is not linearly caused in the "John hit Mary" sense.
The idea is that words or pictures can only be harmful if they produce
harm in a form that is considered an action. Words work in the prov-
ince of attitudes, actions in the realm of behavior. Words cannot consti-
tute harm in themselves-never mind libel, invasion of privacy,
blackmail, bribery, conspiracy or most sexual harassment. But which is
saying "kill" to a trained guard dog, a word or an act? Which is its
training? How about a sign that reads "Whites only"? Is that the idea
or the practice of segregation? Is a woman raped by an attitude or a
behavior? Which is sexual arousal? It is difficult to avoid noticing that
the ascendancy of the specific idea of causality used in obscenity law
dates from around the time that it was first believed to be proved that it
52. T. I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 16-25
(1967). See also T. I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 17 (1970).
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is impossible to prove that pornography causes harm.5 3 Instead of the
more complex causality implicit in the above examples, the view be-
came that pornography must cause harm like negligence causes car acci-
dents or its effects are not cognizable as harm. The trouble with this
individuated, atomistic, linear, isolated, tort-like-in a word, positivis-
tic-conception of injury is that the way pornography targets and de-
fines women for abuse and discrimination does not work like this. It
does hurt individuals, just not as individuals in a one-at-a-time sense,
but as members of the group "women." Harm is caused to one individ-
ual woman rather than another essentially like one number rather than
another is caused in roulette. But on a group basis, as women, the selec-
tion process is absolutely selective and systematic. Its causality is essen-
tially collective and totalistic and contextual. To reassert atomistic
linear causality as a sine qua non of injury-you cannot be harmed unless
you are harmed through this etiology-is to refuse to respond to the true
nature of this specific kind of harm. Such refusals call for explanation.
Morton Horowitz says that the issue of causality in tort law is "one of
the pivotal ideas in a system of legal thought that sought to separate
private law from politics and to insulate the legal system from the threat
of redistribution. '54 Perhaps causality in the pornography issue is an
53. The essentially scientific notion of causality did not first appear in this law at this
time, however. See, e.g., U.S. v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 812-17, 826 n. 70 (1957) (Frank, J.,
concurring) ("According to Judge Bok, an obscenity statute may be validly enforced when
there is proof of a causal relation between a particular book and undesirable conduct. Almost
surely, such proof cannot ever be adduced.").
Werner Heisenberg, criticizing old ideas of atomic physic, in light of Einstein's theory of
relativity, states the conditions that must exist for a causal relation to make sense: "To coordi-
nate a definite cause to a definite effect has sense only when both can be observed without
introducing a foreign element disturbing their interrelation. The law of causality, because of
its very nature, can only be defined for isolated systems..." W. HEISENBERG, THE PHYSI-
CAL PRINCIPLES OF THE QUANTUM THEORY 63 (1930). Among the influences that disturb
the isolation of systems are observors. Underlying the adoption of a causality standard in
obscenity law is a rather hasty analogy between the regularities of physical and social systems,
an analogy which has seldom been explicitly justified or even updated as the physical sciences
have altered their epistemological foundations. This kind of causality may not be readily
susceptible to measurement for the simple reason that social systems are not isolated systems;
experimental research (which is where it has been shown that pornography causes harm) can
only minimize what will always be "foreign elements." Pornography and harm may not be
two definite events anyway; perhaps pornography is a harm. Moreover, if the effects of por-
nography are systematic, they may not be isolable from the system in which they exist. This
would not mean that no harm exists; rather, because the harm is so pervasive, it cannot be
sufficiently isolated to be perceived as existing according to this causality model. In other
words, if pornography is only seen as harmful if it causes harm by this model, and if it exists
socially only in ways that cannot be isolated from society itself, that means that its harm will
not be perceived to exist. I think this describes the conceptual situation in which we find
ourselves.
54. Horowitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 201 (D. Kairys
ed. 1982). The pervasiveness of the objectification of women has been considered as a reason
why pandering should not be Constitutionally restricted: "The advertisements of our best
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attempt to privatize the injury pornography does to women in order to
insulate the same system from the threat of gender equality, also a form
of redistribution.
Women are known to be brutally coerced into pornographic perform-
ances.55 But so far it is only with children, usually male children, that
courts consider that the speech of pornographers was once someone
else's /lfe.56 Courts and commissions and legislatures and researchers
have searched largely in vain for the injury of pornography in the mind
of the (male) consumer or in "society," or in empirical correlations be-
tween variations in levels of "anti-social" acts and liberalization in ob-
scenity laws.5 1 Speech can be regulated "in the interests of unwilling
viewers, captive audiences, young children, and beleaguered neighbor-
magazines are chock-full of thighs, ankles, calves, bosoms, eyes, and hair, to draw the poten-
tial buyer's attention to lotions, tires, food, liquor, clothing, autos, and even insurance poli-
cies." Ginzburg v. U.S., 383 U.S. 463, 482 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas
thereby illustrated, apparently without noticing, that somebody knows that associating sex, i.e.,
women's bodies, with things causes people to act on that association.
55. L. LOVELACE, supra note 10.
56. Two boys masturbating with no showing of explicit force demonstrates the harm of
child pornography in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), while shoving money up a
woman's vagina, among other acts, raises serious questions of "regulation of 'conduct' having
a communicative element" in live sex adjudications, California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 113
(1972) (live sex can be regulated by a state in connection with serving alcoholic beverages).
"Snuff" films, in which a woman is actually murdered to produce a film for sexual entertain-
ment, are known to exist. People v. Douglas and Hernandez, Felony Complaint
#NF8300382, Municipal Court, Judicial District, Orange County, California, August 5,
1983, alleges the murder of two young girls to make a pornographic film.
57. Both Susan Griffin (PORNOGRAPHY AND SILENCE, supra note 15) and the oldest An-
glo-Saxon obscenity cases locate the harm of pornography in the mind of the consumer. See,
e.g., Regina v. Hicklin, 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868) ("tendency ... to deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication of this
sort may fall"). The data of Court and of Kutchinsky, both correlational, reach contrary
conclusions on the issue of the relation of pornography's availability to crime statistics.
Kutchinsky, Towards an Explanation of the Decrease in Registered Sex Crimes in Copenhagen, 7 TECH-
NICAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 263 (1971); Kutch-
insky, The Effect of Easy Avaiiability of Pornography on the Incidence of Sex Crnes: The Danish
Experience, 29 J. oF Soc. ISSUES 163 (1973); f Court, Pornography and Sex Crines: A Re-Evalua-
tion in the Light of Recent Trends Around the World, 5 INT'L J. OF CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY
129 (1977). More recent investigations into correlations focused on rape in the United States
have reached still other conclusions. L. Baron and M. Straus have found a strong correlation
between state-to-state variations in the rate of reported rape and the aggregate circulation
rate of popular men's sex magazines, including PLAYBOY and HUSTLER. "Sexual Stratifica-
tion, Pornography, and Rape," Family Research Laboratory and Department of Sociology,
University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire, Nov. 18, 1983 (manuscript). The
authors conclude, at page 16, that "the findings suggest that the combination of a society
which is characterized by a struggle to secure equal rights for women, by a high readership of
sex magazines which depict women in ways which may legitimize violence, and by a context
in which there is a high level of non-sexual violence, constitutes a mix of societal characteris-
tics which precipitate rape." See also the Williams Report (1981), supra note 24, and the opin-
ions of Justice Harlan on the injury to "society" as a permissible basis for legislative
judgments in this area. Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 501-2 (1956) (concurring in companion
case, Alberts v. California).
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hoods,"'15  but the normal level of sexual force-force that is not seen as
force because it is inflicted on women and called sex-has never been a
policy issue. Until the last few years experimental research never ap-
proached the question of whether pornographic stimuli might support
sexual aggression against women 59 or whether violence might be sexually
stimulating or have sexual sequelae. 60 Only in the last few months are
we beginning to learn the consequences for women of so-called consen-
sual sexual depictions that show normal dominance and submission.
6 1
We still don't know the impact of female-only nudity or of depictions of
specific acts like penetration or of even mutual sex in a social context of
gender inequality.
The most basic assumption underlying First Amendment adjudica-
tion is that, socially, speech is free. The First Amendment says, "Con-
gress shall not abridge the freedom of speech." Free speech exists. The
problem for government is to avoid constraining that which, if uncon-
strained by government, is free. This tends to presuppose that whole
segments of the population are not systematically silenced socialy, prior
to government action. The place of pornography in the inequality of
the sexes makes such a presupposition untenable and makes any ap-
proach to our freedom of expression so based worse than useless. For
women, the urgent issue of freedom of speech is not primarily the avoid-
ance of state intervention as such, but finding an affirmative means to
get access to speech for those to whom it has been denied.
III
Beyond offensiveness or prurience, to say that pornography is "dehu-
manizing" is an attempt to articulate its harm. But "human being" is a
social concept with many possible meanings. Here I will criticize some
liberal moral meanings of personhood through a feminist political anal-
58. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 662 (1978).
59. I am conceiving rape as sexual aggression. The work of Neil Malamuth is the leading
research in this area. See Rape Proclivity Among Men, 37 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 138 (1981); Rape
Fantasies as a Function of Exposure to Violent Sexual Stimuli 10 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
33 (1981); Haber & Feshbach, Testing Hypotheses Regarding Rape: Exposure to Sexual Violence, Sex
Differences, and the "'ormality" of Rapits, 14 J. OF RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY 121 (1980);
Heim & Feshbach, Sexual Responsiveness of College Students to Rape Depictions. Inhihitoly and Dis-
inhibitog Effects, 38 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 399 (1980). See also work by
Malamuth, supra note 9. Of course, there are difficulties in measuring rape as a direct conse-
quence of laboratory experiments, difficulties which have led researchers to substitute other
measures for willingness to aggress.
60. Apparently, it may be impossible to make a film for experimental purposes that por-
trays violence or aggression by a man against a woman that a substantial number of male
experimental subjects do not perceive as sexual. See Hearings, supra note 22, at 31 (testimony of
E. Donnerstein).
61. See works of D. Zillman, supra note 9.
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ysis of what pornography does to women, showing how the inadequacy
of the liberal dehumanization critique reflects the inadequacy of its con-
cept of person. In a feminist perspective, pornography is seen to dehu-
manize women in a culturally specific and empirically descriptive-not
liberal moral-sense, dispossessing women of the power of which, in the
same act, it possesses men: the power of sexual, hence gender, definition.
Perhaps a human being, for gender purposes, is someone who controls
the social definition of sexuality.
A person, in one Kantian view, is a free and rational agent whose
existence is an end in itself, as opposed to instrumental. 62 In pornogra-
phy, women exist to the endof male pleasure. Kant sees human as char-
acterized by universal abstract rationality, with no component of
individual or group differences, and as a "bundle of rights. ' '63 Pornog-
raphy purports to define what a woman ZS. It does this on a group basis,
including when it raises individual qualities to sexual stereotypes, as in
the strategy of Playboy's "Playmate of the Month." I also think that por-
nography derives much of its sexual power, as well as part of its justifica-
tion, from the implicit assumption that the Kantian notion of person
actually describes the condition of women in this society, so that if we
are there, we are freely and rationally there, when the fact is that wo-
men-in pornography and in part because of pornography-have no
such rights.
Other views of the person include one of Wittgenstein's, who says that
the best picture of the human soul is the human body.64 I guess this
depends upon what picture of the human body you have in mind.
Marx's work offers various concepts of personhood deducible from his
critique of various forms of productive organization. Whatever material
conditions the society values, define person there, so that in a bourgeois
society, a person might be a property-owner. 65 The problem here is that
women are the property that constitutes the personhood, the masculin-
ity, of men under capitalism. Thinking further in Marxian theoretical
terms, I have wondered whether women in pornography are more prop-
62. I. KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (T. Abbott
trans. 1969); Danto, Persons, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 10 (P. Edwards ed. 1967);
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
63. See KANT, supra note 62; Danto, supra note 62; Radin, supra note 62. See also the "origi-
nal position" of JOHN RAwt.s, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), and Rawls, Kantian Constructiv-
ism in Moral Theoy, 9 J. PHIL. 515, 533-35 (1980).
64. L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 178 (G. Anscombe trans. 3d ed.
1958).
65. Karl Marx's critique of capitalist society is epitomized in K. MARX, CAPITAL, ch. 1
(1970). His concept of the "fetishism of commodities" in which "relations between men [as-
sume], in thezr eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things" (emphasis added) is also
presented therein. Id. at 72.
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erly conceived as fetishes or objects. Does pornography more attribute
life-likeness to that which is dead-as in fetishism-or make death-like
that which is alive-as in objectification? I guess it depends upon
whether, socially speaking, women are more dead than alive.
In Hume's concept of a person as a bundle or collection of sense per-
ceptions, such that the feeling of self-identity over time is a persistent
illusion,66 we finally have a view of the human that coincides with the
view of women in pornography. That is, the empiricist view of person is
the pornographic view of women. No critique of dominance or subjec-
tion, certainly not of objectification, can be grounded in a vision of real-
ity in which all sense perceptions are just sense perceptions. This is one
way an objectivist epistemology supports the unequal holding and
wielding of power in a society in which the persistent illusion of selfhood
of one half of the population is materially supported and maintained at
the expense of the other half. What I'm saying is that those who are
socially allowed a self are also allowed the luxury of postulating its illu-
soriness and having that called a philosophical position. Whatever self
they ineluctably have, they don't lose by saying it is an illusion. Even if
it is not particularly explanatory, such male ideology, if taken as such, is
often highly descriptive. Thus Hume defines the human in the same
terms feminism uses to define women's dehumanization: for women in
pornography, the self is, precisely, a persistent illusion.
Contemporary ordinary language philosopher Bernard Williams says
"person" ordinarily means things like valuing self-respect and feeling
pain. 67 How self is defined, what respect attaches to, stimuli of pleasure
and to an extent stimuli and threshholds of pain, are cultural variables.
Women in pornography are turned on by being put down and feel pain
as pleasure. We want it; we beg for it; we get it. To argue that this is
dehumanizing need not mean to take respect as an ahistorical absolute
or to treat the social meaning of pain as invariant or uniformly negative.
Rather, it is to argue that it is the acceptance of the social definition of
these values-the acceptance of self-respect and the avoidance of pain as
values-that permits the erotization of their negative-debasement and
torture-in pornography. It is only to the extent that each of these val-
ues is accepted as human that their negation becomes a quality of, and is
66. D. HUME, Of PersonalIdentity, in A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. I, pt. IV, Sec.
VI (1888).
67. B. WILLIAMS, Are Persons Bodies?, Personal Identity and Individualization, and Bodily Con-
tinuity and Personal Identity in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 1, 64 (1973). Bernard Williams was
principal author of the Willtams Report, supra note 22, Britain's equivalent to the U.S. Com-
mission on Obscenity and Pornography, in which none of his values of "persons" were noticed
lacking in, or women deprived of them by, pornography.
342
Vol. 2:321, 1984
Not a Moral Issue
eroticized in and as, woman. Only when self-respect is accepted as
human does debasement become sexy and female; only when the avoid-
ance of pain is accepted as human does torture become sexy and female.
In this way, women's sexuality as expressed in pornography precisely
negatives her status as human. But there is more: exactly what is de-
fined as degrading to a human being, however that is socially defined, is
exactly what is sexually arousing to the male point of view in the por-
nography, just as the one to whom it is done is the girl regardless of sex.
In this way, it is specifically women whom pornography identifies with
and by sexuality, as the erotic is equated with the dehumanizing.
To define the pornographic as that which is violent, not sexual, as
liberal moral analyses tend to, is to trivialize and evade the essence of
this critique, while seeming to express it. As with rape, where the issue is
not the presence or absence of force but what sex is as distinct from
coercion, 68 the question for pornography is what eroticism Zs* as distinct
from the subordination of women. This is not a rhetorical question.
Under male dominance, whatever sexually arouses a man is sex. In por-
nography, the violence i's the sex. The inequality is sex. Pornography
does not work, sexually, without hierarchy. If there is no inequality, no
violation, no dominance, no force, there is no sexual arousal. 69 Obscen-
ity law does the pornographers a real favor by clouding this, pornogra-
phy's central dynamic, under the coy gender-neutral abstraction of
"prurient interest." Obscenity law also adds the dominance interest of
state prohibition to whatever the law of obscenity is seen to encompass.
Calling rape and pornography violent not sexual, the banner of much
anti-rape and anti-pornography organizing, 70 is an attempt to protest
that women do not find rape pleasurable or pornography stimulating
while avoiding claiming this rejection as women's point of view. The con-
cession to the objective stance, the attempt to achieve credibility by cov-
ering up the specificity of one's viewpoint, not only abstracts from our
experience, it lies about it. Women and men know men find rape sexual
and pornography erotic. It therefore is. We also know that sexuality is
commonly violent without being any the less sexual. To deny this sets
up the situation so that when women are aroused by sexual violation,
68. See the articles cited supra note 11.
69. This statement is a conclusion from my analysis of all the empirical data available to
date, the pornography itself, and personal observations.
70. Susan Brownmiller's book AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE, supra note
10, is widely considered to present the view that rape is an act of violence, not sex. Women
Against Pornography, a New York based anti-pornography group, has argued that pornogra-
phy is violence against women, not sex. This has been almost universally taken as the feminist
position on the issue. For an indication of possible change, see 4 NCASA News 19-21 (May
1984).
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meaning we experience it as our sexuality, the feminist analysis is seen to
be contradicted. But it is not contradicted, it is proved The male su-
premacist definition of female sexuality as lust for self-annihilation has
won. It would be surprising, feminist analysis would be wrong, and sex-
ism would be trivial, if this were merely exceptional. (One might ask at
this point, not why some women embrace explicit sado-masochism, but
why any women do not.) To reject forced sex in the name of women's
point of view requires an account of women's experience of being vio-
lated by the same acts both sexes have learned as natural and fulfilling
and erotic when no critique, no alternatives and few transgressions have
been permitted.
The depersonalization critique, with the "violence not sex" critique,
exposes pornography's double standard, but does not attack the mascu-
linity of the standards for personhood and for sex that pornography sets.
The critiques are thus useful, to some extent deconstructive, but beg the
deeper questions of the place of pornography in sexuality and of sexual-
ity in the construction of women's definition and status, because they act
as if women can be "persons" by interpretation, as if the concept is not,
in every socially real way, defined by and in terms of and reserved for
men and as if sexuality is not itself a construct of male power. To do
this is to act as if pornography did not exist or were impotent. Deeper
than the personhood question or the violence question is the question of
the mechanism of social causation by which pornography constructs wo-
men and sex, defines what "woman" means and what sexuality is, in
terms of each other.
The law of obscenity at times says that sexual expression is only talk,
therefore cannot be intrinsically harmful. Yet somehow pornographic
talk is vital to protect. If pornography is a practice of the ideology7' of
gender inequality, and gender is an ideology, if pornography is sex and
gender is sexual, the question of the relation between pornography and
life is nothing less than the question of the dynamic of the subordination
of women to men. If "objectification . . . is never trivial, '7 2 girls are
ruined by books. 73 To comprehend this process will require an entirely
new theory of social causality-of ideology in life, of the dynamic of
mind and body in social power-that connects point of view with poli-
71. This, again, does not mean that it is an idea. A new theory of ideology, prefigured in
Andrea Dworkin's PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 1, will be needed to conceptualize the role of
pornography in constructing the condition of women.
72. A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN, supra note 1, 115.
73. "Echoing Macaulay, 'Jimmy' Walker remarked that he had never heard of a woman
seduced by a book." U.S. v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 812 (1957) (appendix to concurrence of
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tics. The development of such an analysis has been equally stymied by
fear of repressive state use of any critique of any form of expression, by
the power of pornography to create women in its image of use, and by
the power of pornographers to create a climate hostile to inquiry into
their power and profits.
IV
I said all that in order to say this: the law of obscenity has the same
surface theme and the same underlying theme as pornography itself.
Superficially both involve morality: rules made and transgressed for
purposes of sexual arousal. Actually, both are about power, about the
equation between the erotic and the control of women by men: women
made and transgressed for purposes of sexual arousal. It seems essential
to the kick of pornography that it be to some degree against the rules;
but it is never truly unavailable or truly illegitimate. Thus obscenity
law, like the law of rape, preserves the value without restricting the abil-
ity to get, that which it purports to both devalue and to prohibit. Ob-
scenity law helps keep pornography sexy by putting state power-force,
hierarchy-behind its purported prohibition on what men can have sex-
ual access to. The law of obscenity is to pornography as pornography is
to sex: a map that purports to be a mirror, a legitimization and authori-
zation and set of directions and guiding controls that project themselves
onto social reality, while purporting merely to reflect the image of what
is already there. Pornography presents itself as fantasy or illusion or
idea, which can be good or bad as it is accurate or inaccurate, while it
actually, hence accuratey, distributes power. Liberal morality cannot deal
with illusions that constitute reality because its theory of reality, lacking a
substantive critique of the distribution of social power, cannot get be-
hind the empirical world, truth by correspondence. On the surface,
both pornography and the law of obscenity are about sex. In fact, it is
the status of women that is at stake.
